engine: client: introduce cookie protocol extension, when client connects to the server, it provides randomized 64-bit value to be prefixed into netchan messages

* Prevent clientuseragent from leaking data.
* Process qport in netchan, cleaning up code
This commit is contained in:
Alibek Omarov
2026-05-25 23:29:04 +05:00
committed by a1batross
parent d61983a5d2
commit e5c4e49782
7 changed files with 152 additions and 30 deletions

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@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
*/
#include <inttypes.h>
#include "common.h"
#include "client.h"
#include "net_encode.h"
@@ -1156,7 +1157,7 @@ static void CL_SendConnectPacket( connprotocol_t proto, int challenge )
else
{
const char *qport = Cvar_VariableString( "net_qport" );
int extensions = adrtype == NA_LOOPBACK ? 0 : NET_EXT_SPLITSIZE;
int extensions = adrtype == NA_LOOPBACK ? 0 : ( NET_EXT_SPLITSIZE | NET_EXT_NETCHAN_COOKIE );
string key;
ID_GetMD5ForAddress( key, adr, sizeof( key ));
@@ -1171,6 +1172,17 @@ static void CL_SendConnectPacket( connprotocol_t proto, int challenge )
Info_SetValueForKey( protinfo, "qport", qport, sizeof( protinfo ));
Info_SetValueForKeyf( protinfo, "ext", sizeof( protinfo ), "%d", extensions );
if( FBitSet( extensions, NET_EXT_NETCHAN_COOKIE ))
{
uint64_t a = COM_RandomLong( 0, 0xFFFF );
uint64_t b = COM_RandomLong( 0, 0xFFFF );
uint64_t c = COM_RandomLong( 0, 0xFFFF );
uint64_t d = COM_RandomLong( 0, 0xFFFF );
cls.netchan_pending_cookie = ( a << 48 ) | ( b << 32 ) | ( c << 16 ) | d;
Info_SetValueForKeyf( protinfo, "cookie", sizeof( protinfo ), "%016"PRIx64, cls.netchan_pending_cookie );
}
else cls.netchan_pending_cookie = 0;
Netchan_OutOfBandPrint( NS_CLIENT, adr, C2S_CONNECT" %i %i \"%s\" \"%s\"\n", PROTOCOL_VERSION, challenge, protinfo, cls.userinfo );
Con_Printf( "Trying to connect with modern protocol\n" );
}
@@ -1664,10 +1676,19 @@ void CL_SetupNetchanForProtocol( connprotocol_t proto )
if( FBitSet( cls.extensions, NET_EXT_SPLITSIZE ))
Con_Reportf( "^2NET_EXT_SPLITSIZE enabled^7 (packet size is %d)\n", (int)cl_dlmax.value );
if( FBitSet( cls.extensions, NET_EXT_NETCHAN_COOKIE ))
{
Con_Reportf( "^2NET_EXT_NETCHAN_COOKIE enabled^7\n" );
SetBits( flags, NETCHAN_USE_COOKIE );
}
break;
}
Netchan_Setup( NS_CLIENT, &cls.netchan, net_from, Cvar_VariableInteger( "net_qport" ), NULL, pfnBlockSize, flags );
if( FBitSet( flags, NETCHAN_USE_COOKIE ))
Netchan_SetCookie( &cls.netchan, cls.netchan_pending_cookie );
}
/*
@@ -2385,6 +2406,30 @@ static void CL_ClientConnect( connprotocol_t proto, const char *c, netadr_t from
return;
}
if( cls.netchan_pending_cookie != 0 )
{
const char *cookie_str = Info_ValueForKey( Cmd_Argv( 1 ), "cookie" );
if( Q_strlen( cookie_str ) != 16 )
{
Con_Reportf( S_WARN "%s: missing cookie echo from %s, ignoring (possible spoof)\n", __func__, NET_AdrToString( from ));
return;
}
byte buf[8];
COM_HexConvert( cookie_str, 16, buf );
uint64_t echoed = 0;
for( int i = 0; i < 8; i++ )
echoed = ( echoed << 8 ) | buf[i];
if( echoed != cls.netchan_pending_cookie )
{
Con_Reportf( S_WARN "%s: invalid cookie echo from %s, ignoring (possible spoof)\n", __func__, NET_AdrToString( from ));
return;
}
}
cls.build_num = 0; // not used in Xash3D protocols
cls.allow_cheats = Q_atoi( Info_ValueForKey( Cmd_Argv( 1 ), "cheats" ));
}

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@@ -579,6 +579,7 @@ typedef struct
sizebuf_t datagram; // unreliable stuff. gets sent in CL_Move about cl_cmdrate times per second.
byte datagram_buf[MAX_DATAGRAM];
uint64_t netchan_pending_cookie; // random NET_EXT_NETCHAN_COOKIE
netchan_t netchan;
float packet_loss;

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@@ -259,10 +259,24 @@ void Netchan_Setup( netsrc_t sock, netchan_t *chan, netadr_t adr, int qport, voi
chan->use_bz2 = FBitSet( flags, NETCHAN_USE_BZIP2 ) ? true : false;
chan->use_lzss = FBitSet( flags, NETCHAN_USE_LZSS ) ? true : false;
chan->gs_netchan = FBitSet( flags, NETCHAN_GOLDSRC ) ? true : false;
chan->use_cookie = FBitSet( flags, NETCHAN_USE_COOKIE ) ? true : false;
chan->cookie = 0;
MSG_Init( &chan->message, "NetData", chan->message_buf, sizeof( chan->message_buf ));
}
/*
==============
Netchan_SetCookie
called on the client after parsing NET_EXT_NETCHAN_COOKIE in the connect reply
==============
*/
void Netchan_SetCookie( netchan_t *chan, uint64_t cookie )
{
chan->cookie = cookie;
}
/*
==============================
Netchan_IncomingReady
@@ -1673,6 +1687,14 @@ void Netchan_TransmitBits( netchan_t *chan, int length, const byte *data )
chan->outgoing_sequence++;
// prefix the cookie so the peer can authenticate this packet as ours
// before doing anything else with it
if( chan->use_cookie )
{
MSG_WriteLong( &send, (uint)( chan->cookie & 0xFFFFFFFF ));
MSG_WriteLong( &send, (uint)( chan->cookie >> 32 ));
}
MSG_WriteLong( &send, w1 );
MSG_WriteLong( &send, w2 );
@@ -1797,15 +1819,42 @@ qboolean Netchan_Process( netchan_t *chan, sizebuf_t *msg )
// get sequence numbers
MSG_Clear( msg );
// authenticate via the per-connection cookie before parsing anything else;
// a spoofed packet from a remote attacker won't know the 64-bit cookie and
// will be rejected here without touching sequence/ack state
if( chan->use_cookie )
{
if( MSG_GetMaxBytes( msg ) < 16 )
{
Con_Reportf( S_WARN "%s: %s: truncated packet (%d bytes) with cookie expected, dropping\n", __func__, NET_AdrToString( chan->remote_address ), MSG_GetMaxBytes( msg ));
return false;
}
uint32_t cookie_lo = MSG_ReadDword( msg );
uint32_t cookie_hi = MSG_ReadDword( msg );
uint64_t cookie = ((uint64_t)cookie_hi << 32 ) | (uint64_t)cookie_lo;
if( cookie != chan->cookie )
{
Con_Reportf( S_WARN "%s: %s: cookie mismatch, dropping (possible spoof attempt)\n", __func__, NET_AdrToString( chan->remote_address ));
return false;
}
}
uint sequence = MSG_ReadLong( msg );
uint sequence_ack = MSG_ReadLong( msg );
if( chan->use_munge && MSG_GetMaxBytes( msg ) >= 8 )
COM_UnMunge2( msg->pData + 8, MSG_GetMaxBytes( msg ) - 8, sequence & 0xFF );
// read the qport if we are a server
// read the qport if we are a server; serves as a NAT-stable
// connection demultiplexer and rejects packets for the wrong client
if( chan->sock == NS_SERVER )
MSG_ReadShort( msg );
{
if(( MSG_ReadShort( msg ) & 0xffff ) != chan->qport )
return false;
}
uint reliable_message = sequence >> 31;
uint reliable_ack = sequence_ack >> 31;
@@ -1870,7 +1919,9 @@ qboolean Netchan_Process( netchan_t *chan, sizebuf_t *msg )
// reject packets that leap too far ahead of the expected sequence
// skip on the very first packet — the server starts with a random
// outgoing_sequence, so the first one legitimately jumps far ahead of 0
if( chan->incoming_sequence != 0 && net_sequence_window.value > 0 && sequence > chan->incoming_sequence + (uint)net_sequence_window.value )
// NOTE: disable sequence window with cookie extension, if cookie ext proves
// to be inefficient, we can safely enable sequence window back
if( !chan->use_cookie && chan->incoming_sequence != 0 && net_sequence_window.value > 0 && sequence > chan->incoming_sequence + (uint)net_sequence_window.value )
{
Con_Printf( S_WARN "%s: %s: sequence %u jumps %u ahead of expected %i (window %i), dropping\n",
__func__, NET_AdrToString( chan->remote_address ),

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@@ -167,10 +167,11 @@ typedef enum fragsize_e
typedef enum netchan_flags_e
{
NETCHAN_USE_MUNGE = BIT( 0 ),
NETCHAN_USE_BZIP2 = BIT( 1 ),
NETCHAN_GOLDSRC = BIT( 2 ),
NETCHAN_USE_LZSS = BIT( 3 ), // mutually exclusive with bzip2
NETCHAN_USE_MUNGE = BIT( 0 ),
NETCHAN_USE_BZIP2 = BIT( 1 ),
NETCHAN_GOLDSRC = BIT( 2 ),
NETCHAN_USE_LZSS = BIT( 3 ), // mutually exclusive with bzip2
NETCHAN_USE_COOKIE = BIT( 4 ), // per-connection 64-bit cookie prefixed to every sequenced packet (NET_EXT_NETCHAN_COOKIE)
} netchan_flags_t;
// Network Connection Channel
@@ -240,6 +241,8 @@ typedef struct netchan_s
qboolean use_bz2;
qboolean use_lzss;
qboolean gs_netchan;
qboolean use_cookie;
uint64_t cookie;
} netchan_t;
extern netadr_t net_from;
@@ -252,6 +255,7 @@ extern int net_drop;
void Netchan_Init( void );
void Netchan_Shutdown( void );
void Netchan_Setup( netsrc_t sock, netchan_t *chan, netadr_t adr, int qport, void *client, int (*pfnBlockSize)(void *, fragsize_t mode ), uint flags );
void Netchan_SetCookie( netchan_t *chan, uint64_t cookie );
void Netchan_CreateFileFragmentsFromBuffer( netchan_t *chan, const char *filename, byte *pbuf, int size );
qboolean Netchan_CopyNormalFragments( netchan_t *chan, sizebuf_t *msg, size_t *length );
qboolean Netchan_CopyFileFragments( netchan_t *chan, sizebuf_t *msg );

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@@ -283,7 +283,8 @@ extern const char *const svc_quake_strings[svc_lastmsg+1];
extern const char *const svc_goldsrc_strings[svc_lastmsg+1];
// FWGS extensions
#define NET_EXT_SPLITSIZE (1U<<0) // set splitsize by cl_dlmax
#define NET_EXT_SPLITSIZE (1U<<0) // set splitsize by cl_dlmax
#define NET_EXT_NETCHAN_COOKIE (1U<<1) // per-connection 64-bit netchan cookie validated on every sequenced packet
// GoldSrc protocol definitions
#define PROTOCOL_GOLDSRC_VERSION 48

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@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
*/
#include <inttypes.h>
#include "common.h"
#include "const.h"
#include "server.h"
@@ -301,6 +302,7 @@ static void SV_ConnectClient( netadr_t from )
const char *s;
int extensions;
uint netchan_flags = 0;
uint64_t netchan_cookie = 0;
if( Cmd_Argc() < 5 )
{
@@ -345,6 +347,27 @@ static void SV_ConnectClient( netadr_t from )
qport = Q_atoi( Info_ValueForKey( protinfo, "qport" ));
extensions = Q_atoi( Info_ValueForKey( protinfo, "ext" ));
if( FBitSet( extensions, NET_EXT_NETCHAN_COOKIE ))
{
const char *cookie_str = Info_ValueForKey( protinfo, "cookie" );
if( Q_strlen( cookie_str ) != 16 )
{
SV_RejectConnection( from, "client advertised NET_EXT_NETCHAN_COOKIE but did not supply a cookie\n" );
return;
}
byte buf[8];
COM_HexConvert( cookie_str, 16, buf );
for( int i = 0; i < 8; i++ )
netchan_cookie = ( netchan_cookie << 8 ) | buf[i];
}
// these keys aren't useragent
Info_RemoveKey( protinfo, "cookie" );
Info_RemoveKey( protinfo, "ext" );
Info_RemoveKey( protinfo, "qport" );
s = Cmd_Argv( 4 ); // user info
if( Q_strlen( s ) > sizeof( userinfo ) || !Info_IsValid( s ))
@@ -419,7 +442,7 @@ static void SV_ConnectClient( netadr_t from )
newcl->frames = frames;
newcl->userid = g_userid++; // create unique userid
newcl->state = cs_connected; // now expect "spawn" command
newcl->extensions = FBitSet( extensions, NET_EXT_SPLITSIZE );
newcl->extensions = FBitSet( extensions, NET_EXT_SPLITSIZE | NET_EXT_NETCHAN_COOKIE );
Q_strncpy( newcl->useragent, protinfo, sizeof( newcl->useragent ));
// HACKHACK: can hear all players by default to avoid issues
@@ -429,7 +452,11 @@ static void SV_ConnectClient( netadr_t from )
// initailize netchan
if( !Host_IsLocalClient( ))
SetBits( netchan_flags, NETCHAN_USE_LZSS );
if( FBitSet( newcl->extensions, NET_EXT_NETCHAN_COOKIE ))
SetBits( netchan_flags, NETCHAN_USE_COOKIE );
Netchan_Setup( NS_SERVER, &newcl->netchan, from, qport, newcl, SV_GetFragmentSize, netchan_flags );
if( FBitSet( newcl->extensions, NET_EXT_NETCHAN_COOKIE ))
Netchan_SetCookie( &newcl->netchan, netchan_cookie );
MSG_Init( &newcl->datagram, "Datagram", newcl->datagram_buf, sizeof( newcl->datagram_buf )); // datagram buf
Q_strncpy( newcl->hashedcdkey, Info_ValueForKey( protinfo, "uuid" ), 32 );
@@ -439,6 +466,8 @@ static void SV_ConnectClient( netadr_t from )
protinfo[0] = '\0';
Info_SetValueForKeyf( protinfo, "ext", sizeof( protinfo ), "%d", newcl->extensions );
Info_SetValueForKey( protinfo, "cheats", sv_cheats.value ? "1" : "0", sizeof( protinfo ));
if( FBitSet( newcl->extensions, NET_EXT_NETCHAN_COOKIE ))
Info_SetValueForKeyf( protinfo, "cookie", sizeof( protinfo ), "%016"PRIx64, netchan_cookie );
// send the connect packet to the client
Netchan_OutOfBandPrint( NS_SERVER, from, S2C_CONNECTION" %s", protinfo );

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@@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ SV_ReadPackets
static void SV_ReadPackets( void )
{
sv_client_t *cl;
int i, qport;
int i;
size_t curSize;
while( NET_GetPacket( NS_SERVER, &net_from, net_message_buffer, &curSize ))
@@ -391,13 +391,6 @@ static void SV_ReadPackets( void )
continue;
}
// read the qport out of the message so we can fix up
// stupid address translating routers
MSG_Clear( &net_message );
MSG_ReadLong( &net_message ); // sequence number
MSG_ReadLong( &net_message ); // sequence number
qport = (int)MSG_ReadShort( &net_message ) & 0xffff;
// check for packets from connected clients
for( i = 0, sv.current_client = svs.clients; i < svs.maxclients; i++, sv.current_client++ )
{
@@ -409,24 +402,22 @@ static void SV_ReadPackets( void )
if( !NET_CompareBaseAdr( net_from, cl->netchan.remote_address ))
continue;
if( cl->netchan.qport != qport )
if( !Netchan_Process( &cl->netchan, &net_message ))
continue;
// authenticated; safe to adopt the (possibly NAT-rewritten) source port
if( cl->netchan.remote_address.port != net_from.port )
cl->netchan.remote_address.port = net_from.port;
if( Netchan_Process( &cl->netchan, &net_message ))
{
if(( svs.maxclients == 1 && !host_limitlocal.value ) || ( cl->state != cs_spawned ))
SetBits( cl->flags, FCL_SEND_NET_MESSAGE ); // reply at end of frame
if(( svs.maxclients == 1 && !host_limitlocal.value ) || ( cl->state != cs_spawned ))
SetBits( cl->flags, FCL_SEND_NET_MESSAGE ); // reply at end of frame
// this is a valid, sequenced packet, so process it
if( cl->frames != NULL && cl->state != cs_zombie )
{
SV_ExecuteClientMessage( cl, &net_message );
svgame.globals->frametime = sv.frametime;
svgame.globals->time = sv.time;
}
// this is a valid, sequenced packet, so process it
if( cl->frames != NULL && cl->state != cs_zombie )
{
SV_ExecuteClientMessage( cl, &net_message );
svgame.globals->frametime = sv.frametime;
svgame.globals->time = sv.time;
}
// fragmentation/reassembly sending takes priority over all game messages, want this in the future?